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Morality is so steeped in the quotidian details of praise and blame, of do’s and 
don’t’s, and of questions about the justifiability of certain practices it is no wonder 
that philosophers and psychologists have devoted relatively little effort to 
investigating what makes moral life possible in the first place. In making this 
claim I neither ignore Kant or his intellectual descendants, nor the large literature 
in developmental moral psychology from Piaget on. My charge has to do with 
this fact: Morality is an ineliminable feature of human life and human beings are 
biological creatures. Hence, what wants explaining is how a biological creature — 
a creature with an evolved mind/brain — can be a normative creature of a 
particular kind, that is, a creature that cannot help but engage in moral appraisal 
and evaluation. It does no good to try to wring such an explanation from the 
‘very concept’ of agency (whatever that might be) à la Korsgaard (1996). Such a 
strategy merely delays the inevitable: How is it that biological creatures are 
agents? And while we can understand the practical value of charting the 
trajectory of babbling infants to toddlers to adolescents to adults, absent an 
account of the foundations of the capacities whose emergence constitutes this 
trajectory, we will still not have addressed the central question. 
 Sociobiology and evolutionary ethics fare no better. The apparent puzzle of 
cooperation amidst competition can and has been addressed via the notions of 
kin selection and reciprocal altruism. But these accounts are motivated by, and 
hence pitched at, the level of overt behavior. However, being a moral creature, in 
the sense that makes such entities apt subjects for deep intellectual investigation, 
has very little to do with whether they behave well (sometimes? often? on 
average? ever?) and everything to do with being capable of a certain kind of 
cognition. 
 Moral creatures are distinguished by the possession of moral minds. Or, to 
use Chomsky’s preferred term, which serves to keep us honest, moral creatures 
are distinguished by their possession of moral mind/brains. Animals with moral 
mind/brains are built to cognize the world in a particular way; namely, as 
populated by objects of moral concern, by subjects of moral expectations, and by 
targets of moral evaluation. We replace description with explanation only when, 
taking the fact of our biological nature seriously, we come to know what 
capacities comprise moral cognition and then to discover what makes their 




possession and operation possible. And while the story we tell about the 
underlying psychological mechanisms that constitute moral minds will have to 
be intelligible from an evolutionary point of view (once shorn of problematic 
adaptationism), that constraint leaves open more possibilities than are envisioned 
by extant sociobiology and evolutionary ethics. 
 This is a profoundly interesting and exciting research project. If it turns you 
on — which it should, or if it raises your skeptical hackles, which it may — then 
you can do no better than to read Marc Hauser’s (2006) superb book Moral Minds: 
How Nature Designed our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong. It is a wonderful 
compendium of a vast array of empirical work — developmental cognitive 
psychology, ethology, neuroscience, experimental economics, and brain science 
— bearing on two major issues: (i) What is at the core of morality (i.e., what 
mechanisms and processes are distinctively involved in moral capacities) and (ii) 
which aspects of morality are unique to human beings? More importantly, Moral 
Minds is also philosophically sophisticated, engaging substantively with the long-
standing debate in moral philosophy concerning the relative causal contributions 
of reason and emotion to the etiology of moral judgment and the action such 
judgment is thought to motivate. In the emerging field of empirical moral 
psychology, it is rare to find a work that is at once so comprehensive, accessible, 
fair-minded, and non-condescending to any discipline as Moral Minds. The 
bottom line: If you are new to the field, read Hauser’s book before your read 
anything else. 
 In developing his central idea that humans “evolved a moral instinct, a 
capacity that naturally grows within each child, designed to generate rapid 
judgments about what is morally right or wrong based on an unconscious 
grammar of action” (p. xvii), Hauser exploits more fully than anyone to date the 
so-called linguistic analogy (see also Dwyer 1999, 2006, 2007, and Mikhail, in 
press). First posited, with a distinctly epistemological bent, by John Rawls in his 
A Theory of Justice (1971), ‘the linguistic analogy’ refers to one among several 
nativist approaches to moral psychology. For the empirically-minded moral 
philosopher, the striking parallels between the nature and development of moral 
competence and the nature and development of linguistic competence render the 
appropriation of certain concepts and a particular methodological approach from 
theoretical linguistics most appealing. 
 Very roughly, the parallels in question are: 
 
• language and morality involve distinctive human capacities that 
appear to arise early in all individual members of the species 
relatively effortlessly; 
• language and morality are both normative systems in the sense 
that they involve constraints on human judgment; 
• moral creatures have moral intuitions that appear to be as natural, 
automatic and certain as speakers’ linguistic intuitions (e.g., 
Trolley Problem data); 
• despite the universality of morality and language there is diversity 
among the world’s moralities and the world’s languages. 





 In addition, what we know about the development of children’s moral 
capacities — that is, their capacities to judge moral saliency and to attribute 
moral praise and blame — suggests that in the moral domain, as in the linguistic 
domain, we are faced with a set of phenomena that emerge relatively 
independently of variations in the child’s environment. Children across the globe 
grow into moral creatures in human (thus morally-inflected) environments. 
However, the capacities they develop develop whether or not they receive lots of 
explicit moral instruction, whether or not they mature in a religious culture, and 
so on. Hence, as is the case with language, poverty of stimulus considerations 
appear to be apt (see Dwyer 2006). 
 The motivating idea behind the linguistic analogy, then, is not that morality 
is “like” language, presuming that notion even makes sense. Nor is it merely that 
morality and language appear to be two species-wide and species-specific 
phenomena. Rather, the deep reason for looking to linguistics for help in thinking 
about morality is that the fact of our being moral creatures — like the fact of our 
being speakers — is underpinned by a normative faculty. 
 We can usefully think of any normative faculty (and there might be such 
for logic and aesthetics, too) as a structure of constraints in the mind/brain that 
carves out a possibility space with respect to a certain domain. It may be 
characterized in terms of principles that ‘express’ the constraints it imposes. Very 
crudely, just as Universal Grammar constrains how a child acquires the grammar 
of her language and that grammar in turn constrains what meanings she can 
assign to what signals, so too, we might imagine a Universal Moral Grammar 
that constrains how a child acquires the grammar of her morality and that 
grammar constrains what evaluations she can assign to what bits of the world. 
And just as the acquisition of a particular grammar is dependent on local 
conditions (namely, the child’s linguistic environment), we should predict that 
the acquisition of a particular moral grammar will bear the marks of the moral 
environment in which it occurs. 
 Given the success of the Chomskyan program in linguistics and the 
parallels between morality and language of the sort just sketched, inquirers 
would be crazy not to push the linguistic analogy as far as we can. For, this is the 
best going approach to addressing what I said at the outset is essential: To 
explain how biological creatures can also be moral creatures. That said, this 
approach is still very new. And while Hauser makes considerable progress, he is 
cognizant that, at present, pursuing the linguistic analogy sets up interesting 
research questions rather than answers them. 
 The capacity to judge that an action is permissible, obligatory or forbidden 
is just one capacity involved in moral competence. Others include attributions of 
praise and blame and (perhaps) the capacity to conform one’s behavior to moral 
judgments in the face of significant temptation to do otherwise. Still, if we are 
trying to investigate the nature of an alleged moral faculty the above-mentioned 
judgments (which I shall dub collectively Permissibility Judgments) are a good 
place to start, for they are easily obtained in naturalistic and experimental 
settings. 
 Hauser and his collaborators have made good use of the Permissibility 
Judgments of subjects who have signed on The Moral Sense Test (see 




http://moral.wjh.harvard.edu). The Moral Sense Test deploys familiar Trolley 
Problem thought experiments to elicit judgments from subjects and also asks 
subjects to provide justifications for those judgments. We may take such data as 
starting points for considering what principles (if any) people use in making 
Permissibility Judgments. For the past twenty-five years or so, many 
philosophers have pursued this project (see Fischer & Ravizza 1992), some 
emphasizing a morally asymmetric distinction between acts and omissions, 
others the so-called Doctrine of Double Effect, according to which an act with a 
good and bad effect may yet be permissible if the agent does not aim at the 
producing the bad effect and that effect is not a necessary means for realizing the 
good effect. The articulation of such distinctions and principles is useful, but it is 
just a start. We would like to know how it is that human beings conceive of 
actions and scenarios such that they could appeal (implicitly or explicitly) to such 
distinctions and principles in making Permissibility Judgments at all. Clearly, the 
capacity to make Permissibility Judgments is contingent on the possession and 
operation of other perceptual, cognitive, and (perhaps) affective capacities. 
 A central and crucially important contribution of Hauser’s book is his 
careful exploration of what we can call the parsing of actions. “When [a creature 
with a moral mind] evaluates an action vis-à-vis its permissibility, it is 
unconsciously and automatically assessing the causal and intentional aspects of 
the action and its consequences” (p. 267). In Chapter 6, Hauser articulates the 
most basic principles whose possession is necessary for the very recognition of an 
action — as opposed to a mere happening. At the very least, such recognition 
involves the attribution of primitive agency and the disposition to identify the 
causal consequences of the operation of agency. 
 That the capacity to make Permissibility Judgments requires the possession 
of other capacities should strike anyone as a no-brainer as soon as the claim is 
noted. So the lack of attention to this fact by the vast majority of Anglo-American 
moral philosophers is breathtaking. But the real import of Hauser’s work here is 
not the revelation of philosophers’ inadequacies. (Indeed, Hauser has a deep and 
evident respect for the necessity of philosophical work in moral psychology.) 
Rather, his analysis allows us more clearly to address questions about what 
capacities had by the morally-minded are uniquely moral and about whether 
non-human animals are can be moral-minded. More generally, Hauser makes 
vivid the fact that moral philosophy simply cannot be an armchair enterprise. 
Progress in the discipline demands a methodology that integrates conceptual and 
empirical considerations. He is not the first to emphasize this point, but Moral 
Minds is the first work of this length to illustrate comprehensively how such a 
methodology is to be conducted and to reveal, with a suitably critical eye, its 
fruits to date. 
 At the very least, the making of Permissibility Judgments implicates the 
identification of agents and a theory of mind. Arguably, it also involves a 
particular suite of emotions or affective capacities, say, those required for the 
identification of relevant notions of harm. Now, some non-human animals clearly 
manifest some of these capacities, but these capacities are adjuncts to and not 
uniquely in the service of moral competence. Human beings, in contrast, possess 
all the relevant adjunct capacities. Still this alone does not support the existence 





of a moral faculty, namely, a dedicated part of the human mind/brain. Indeed, 
one might think that once we have identified the cognitive and affective 
capacities a creature must possess in order to make Permissibility Judgments, we 
have effectively provided a reduction of sorts; there is no need to posit a moral 
faculty per se. 
 This thought would appear to be behind one of the late Richard Rorty’s 
worries, as expressed in his review of Hauser’s book for The New York Times 
(Rorty 2007). Rorty complains that, in order to argue for a moral faculty, one 
needs to show “a bright line separating […] ‘the moral domain’ — one that 
nonhuman species cannot enter — from other domains”. To my knowledge, no 
one has been able provide the asked-for criteria. Elliot Turiel (1983) attempts to 
do so in his much discussed posit, the moral conventional distinction. (See Kelly 
et al. 2007 for critique.) But, really, it is peevish to demand them. Human beings 
make moral judgments all the time. What we need to get a Hauser-like project 
going is a list of the explananda for moral psychology — namely, a list of the 
capacities, dispositions and so on that characterize our moral life.  
Absolutely central here is the capacity for judgment. Human beings do not 
merely believe that certain actions are permissible or obligatory and others not. 
They judge them to be so — either when actually confronted with them or when 
considering them hypothetically. Moreover, human beings produce such 
judgments about indefinitely many cases in systematic ways, where the 
systematicity here has to do with the fact that all human beings make moral 
judgments, and that there appear to be culturally-specific differences in the 
content of moral judgments. And, finally, all ‘normally’ developing children 
acquire the capacity to make moral judgments in environments impoverished in 
crucial dimensions. (A child’s socio-cultural and familial environment will 
undoubtedly influence the content of the moral judgments she is apt to make. But 
they do not determine the very capacity to make such judgments themselves.) 
 The virtues of adopting some form of the linguistic analogy seriously are 
manifest. We do not (or, at least should not) demand of linguists that they provide 
a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for what counts as the linguistic 
domain before we ready to take seriously various hypotheses about syntactic 
rules. This point is related to Chomsky’s long-standing but remarkably 
overlooked admonition that there is no serious scientific inquiry to be done with 
respect to E-languages (Mandarin, French etc.). The targets of the relevant science 
is I-language (what is in the mind/brain of particular individuals that accounts 
for the acceptability judgments they make) and the language faculty (what is part 
of every human being’s mind/brain that accounts for the universal acquisition of 
an I-language in relevantly impoverished environments). And the project is to 
uncover what principles characterize the operation of the moral faculty. 
 Now, one should not be misled by the mention of principles here into 
thinking that Hauser’s idea is that principles like the Doctrine of Double Effect 
are innately encoded in the human mind/brain. As he himself notes (p. 295), 
these principles are far too coarse grained. And, as in the case of language, there 
is really no reason to expect that the principles that do characterize the operation 
of the moral faculty would be recognizable to the creatures with such a faculty. 
Ordinary speakers are not consciously aware of a principle about the violation of 




island constraints. And professional linguists, who are perfectly familiar with 
such a principle, do not explicitly consult in speaking. (See Dwyer 2007.) 
Admittedly, it is tempting to think that moral principles are readily accessible 
to the layperson and the professional alike. It seems to us that morality ought to 
be more articulable. However, I think this is merely symptomatic of the fact that 
contemporary moral philosophy is comprised of a good deal of normative ethics 
— the discussion of whether particular practices, like voluntary active 
euthanasia, say, are permissible. These discussions readily trade in explicit 
principles, such as that killing is morally worse than letting die. I have no doubt 
about the pragmatic importance of such talk for debating and formulating public 
policy and in the education of undergraduate philosophy students. However, it 
would be curious indeed if such principles were innately given in the human 
mind/brain.  
Skeptics can, if they wish, deny the reality of morality altogether and insist 
that there is nothing to moral philosophy really except the articulation of some 
local conventions, that there is nothing to moral experience except the explicit 
inculcation of such conventions and of a fear of the sanctions attaching to their 
violation; in short, that there is nothing deep for science to uncover about moral 
minds, for there are no moral minds. Hauser’s book will not appeal to such folks, 
but I do wish they would read it! Everyone else, however, should be stimulated 
by the empirical project Hauser has begun to explain the fact that human beings 
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